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The Unfinished Nature of Women's Leadership in Higher Education

Tessa DeLaquil

Abstract
Development in gender equality in higher education is not uniform, especially lagging in positions of leadership and decision-making. It may be considered as "unfinished" or "partial" at national/regional, historical and sociocultural, and individual levels, and thus requires concerted efforts to provide support at each level.

Development toward achieving the human right of gender equality in the higher education context is not uniform, especially lagging when it comes to positions of leadership and decision-making. Gender equality in higher education leadership may be considered to be "unfinished" or "partial" at national/regional, historical and sociocultural, and individual levels. Thus, addressing this issue and working to achieve this goal requires concerted efforts to provide supports at each of these levels.

While overall access of women to higher education as students has risen in some but not all regions (sometimes reaching over parity), this development is not uniform and is by and large not paralleled in positions of leadership and decision-making, according to the latest International Brief for Higher Education Leaders from the American Council on Education (ACE) and the Center for International Higher Education (CIHE), titled *Women's Representation in Higher Education Leadership Around the World*.

The Brief reveals the "unfinished" business of achieving gender equality at individual, institutional, national, and international levels. Indeed, the proportion of women in senior leadership positions in the examined country cases ranges from negligible participation at higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ghana (Adu-Yeboah et al.) or public HEIs in Hong Kong (Chelan Li & Chui Ping Kam), to few positions at Islamic and public HEIs in Indonesia (Ferary), to 10 percent in Malaysia (Azman), 19.5 percent in South Africa (Moodly), 24 percent in Kazakhstan (Kuzhabekova), and 28 percent of vice-chancellor positions in Australian HEIs (Di Iorio).

Although the barriers and supports related to the achievement of women leaders in higher education vary by social and historical context, there are certain identifiable commonalities across the country cases that make clear the unfinished nature of the project of achieving gender equality in women's leadership in higher education.

Understanding the Elements of Women's Leadership in Higher Education

The unfinished nature of the achievement of the human right of gender equality, in terms of representation of women in leadership in general and in higher education in particular, may be understood as partial at three levels in relation to: national/regional context; historical effects and sociocultural foundations; individuals and the complexity of individual identity, including factors of marginalization.

For instance, the general paucity of women in leadership in higher education is visible even in some countries where representation of women in the pipeline (in undergraduate and graduate degree programs) is reaching parity. This phenomenon varies by regional and national context, by institutional type (e.g., by university ranking and classification), and by societal culture, tradition, and the related sociocultural expectations imposed upon women. Intersectionality also determines outcomes, as other markers of marginalization further restrict representation and participation for women in positions of higher education leadership.

Barriers to Achieving Gender Equality in Higher Education Leadership

Since barriers to achieving gender equality in higher education leadership occur at each of these levels (national or institutional, cultural, and individual), effective supports and structural change must also respond at each level. According to the cases in the

3

4

Brief, we see that when support is lacking at one of these levels, the overall project for achieving gender equality in higher education tends to stagnate or fails to materialize.

While we are unable to address every cause of gender imbalance in leadership, the academic community is not powerless. The so-called glass ceiling is maintained at least in part through structural and cultural complacency within our institutions and our academic communities.

The contributions in the Brief raise certain barriers that reoccur at both institutional and societal levels. At these levels, barriers include culturally and societally defined gender roles, historically and religiously entrenched cultural standards, an unfair division of domestic labor, and a lack of recognition of the effects of intersectionality. Both institutionally and societally, barriers include the evident gender pay gap, gendered stereotypes with regards to leadership competency, the leaky pipeline through the fraught pathway of the professoriate, and the present underrepresentation in leadership positions. A general lack of sex-disaggregated data further limits effective policy decision-making.

The precarity of the gains made in gender equality is palpable in the exacerbation of these trends and barriers during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, the persistence of gender equality in relation to domestic labor and family care is discernible in the decline in academic manuscripts submitted by women during the pandemic period. The idea of the "glass cliff" (that women are overrepresented in leadership during institutional crisis) suggests that taking on precarious leadership positions may discourage other women pursuing future advancement to academic leadership.

Supports to Achieving Gender Equality in Higher Education Leadership

Effective supports must therefore also address barriers at the three levels of nation or institution, society and culture, and individual. Broad national level policies explicitly supporting gender equality may encourage cultural and structural change. Institutional policies are necessary in order to ensure procedural justice, for instance, around parental leave, workload expectations, and recruitment, hiring, and promotion practices. Sex-disaggregated data collection must be set up both within higher education institutions and national systems of higher education in order to support policy-decision making at each level of support.

At an individual level, targeted programming for leadership development and other forms of mentorship programming have been put into place in several countries. Also, higher education networks, both within and external to institutional or national structures, that include programs for finding, mentoring, and training women in higher education seem to be a highly effective mechanism for supporting women's leadership in higher education.

However, it is not sufficient to merely support individual women in the navigation of the structures within which they find themselves. Structural injustice must be met by procedural justice through national and institutional level policy. Cultural changes can also begin within HEIs as countercultural spaces, as demonstrated by Renn's contribution to the Brief on leadership at women's colleges. As such, justice can be achieved via a cultural change in our approach to women in leadership, e.g., through institutional policy changes championed by vocal leadership.

Support and encouragement for individual women to achieve their career goals can be productive, but are generally most useful when accompanied by institutional and national leadership and programming. Indeed, as Regulska asserts in this Brief, ensuring that the human right of gender equality is met will require both individual and collective action.

In the end, all of the contributions to the Brief imply that the most significant barrier to women's equality in higher education is a tenacious complacency within our academic communities. We have the tools in hand that are required to effect initial change. What is needed now is the will to work toward achieving true gender equality within our academic communities and our institutions, with the hope that these steps will also build toward the achievement of this human right beyond our universities, in our nations and our world.

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Is Sino–American Scientific Collaboration a Thing of the Past?

David S. Zweig

Scientific exchanges enhance humankind. Thus, a major component of Sino–US rapprochement after 1978 was academic and scholarly exchanges, eventually leading to collaborative research. Such efforts have been lauded. In 2014, the president of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Francis Collins, speaking at Fudan University in Shanghai, said that "science has no borders because knowledge belongs to all humankind," while an internal NIH review found that between 2010 and 2019, joint projects funded by NIH and the Chinese had produced several high-impact papers on cancer.

So, What Went Wrong?

Changes in Chinese policy, the high level of cutting-edge technology that has gravitated to China, and shifts in the United States' perceptions of its national security, ended this cozy relationship.

To benefit from its overseas talent, Chinese institutions, such as the ministry of education (MOE), the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), established programs to bring back the country's best and brightest. However, as the very best scientists in the Chinese diaspora chose to stay abroad, both the MOE and the CCP offered part-time affiliations with Chinese universities, whereby these researchers maintained their jobs overseas and continued their research in Western laboratories. They also trained tens of thousands of Mainland PhD candidates and postdoctoral fellows who worked with them in their laboratories.

But around 2013, the CCP stopped publishing the names of part-time participants in its Thousand Talents Plan (TTP), taking the program underground. In 2018, the Trump administration's *National Defense Strategy* labelled China a "strategic competitor" seeking global preeminence. Replacing inter-state strategic competition with terrorism as the primary concern of US national security securitized scientific collaboration.

The China Initiative Targets Collaboration

Hence the Department of Justice (DOJ)'s "China Initiative." Directed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), it accused ethnic Chinese students, professors, scientific researchers, and commercial actors of being "non-traditional collectors" of intelligence. It also tried to delink US and Chinese academic and scientific cooperation. Thus, Collins' statement cited above, heralding Sino–American collaboration, has been removed from the NIH website.

The impetus for this campaign came from the top, with President Trump accusing most Chinese students of being spies. The director of the FBI called for a "whole of society" defense against what he claimed was an unprecedented "whole of society" Chinese attack. At an April 2018 congressional hearing entitled "Scholars or Spies," Congressman Lamar Smith accused China of planting "sleeper agents" in US universities to steal scientific breakthroughs.

The NIH and the FBI Get to Work

The Trump administration employed two strategies. Granting agencies, particularly the NIH, pressured universities and laboratories to investigate their China-born researchers or face funding cuts. Some suspended Chinese faculty without strong cause in order to insure continued NIH funding. According to Dr. Epling-Burnette, who was fired from a major research institute for not disclosing her China connections, "these institutions live

Abstract
A laudable component of Sino–US rapprochement after 1978 has been collaborative research. But China's aggressive effort to benefit from its scientific diaspora, the cutting-edge technology that has gravitated to China from the United States, and America's new perception of China as a "strategic competitor," led the Trump administration to roll out the "China Initiative," securitizing scientific collaboration. Despite a strong pushback from universities and Asian–American rights groups, this scientific cooperation remains at risk.

5

in absolute fear of NIH and worry that, if they don't go overboard in taking action, NIH might cut them off." US granting agencies also toughened their guidelines concerning how institutions and individuals should report foreign funding and affiliations. Still, the NIH official leading these investigations admitted to the author that the total funding potentially misused by researchers tied to China was approximately 0.5 percent of all NIH funding available for institutions and individuals outside the NIH itself.

Second, the FBI pressured its 94 field offices to find spies. In an interview, then Assistant Attorney General John Demers admitted that the DOJ wanted each district to bring in one or two per year. The results were predictable. In the case of Dr. Anming Hu, who was fired from the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, the FBI agent who arrested Hu for spying admitted under oath that he had no proof to back his claims.

> *The FBI pressured its 94 field offices to find spies.*

What Do You Do When You Have No Proof?
The FBI and DOJ, often lacking such proof, have sought convictions and punishments for more minor offenses, such as lying to the FBI about participation in Chinese government programs (lying to the FBI is a criminal offense), or not fully disclosing to US granting agencies one's relations with Chinese institutions (which can lead to wire fraud). Without grants, graduate students, or even a job, many have returned to China, where they are often warmly welcomed. Yet, according to Rory Truex of Princeton University, with about 107,000 Chinese citizens working in STEM subjects at the graduate level or above, the criminality rate as of 2020 in this population is less than 1/10,000. In July of 2021, the DOJ dropped charges against nine Mainland-born academics who allegedly engaged in nefarious activity.

Defending America's Open Scientific Environment
The chancellors of Stanford University, University of California–Berkeley, University of California–Davis, University of California–Los Angeles, the University of Michigan, Rice University, and others, have resisted these pressures. The president of MIT agreed to pay the legal defense for a senior researcher, Chen Gang. The Baylor College of Medicine did not fire staff who had not followed NIH policies on disclosure because these actions were "not serious enough to merit disciplinary action." Many have accused the DOJ of racial profiling, arguing that the belief that certain racial groups disproportionately commit certain crimes leads to conviction rates that appear to confirm those stereotypes. NIH and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) have been accused of "moving the goals posts," so that past actions that were previously seen as positive suddenly become conspiratorial activity. Writing in *Science* in July 2019, Dr. Elias Zerhouni, former director of NIH, argued that "for years, scientific exchanges and collaborations with China were encouraged by US policymakers, including implicit support of China's Thousand Talents Program." Further, he argued, as federally funded scientists took positions in China, the United States did not object. Finally, the "rules," now presented and enforced as severe violations of US ethics and intellectual property regulations, were not rigorously implemented by many US institutions. Even the US Government Accountability Office admitted in December 2020 that the goal posts were moved.

The Risks of the China Initiative
The risks of the China Initiative are numerous. At a personal level, life has become deeply uncomfortable for Mainland-born scientists and academics working in the United States, many of whom cherished America's open scientific culture. Second, their productivity has made China America's largest collaborator since 2011. In fact, in terms of articles published in high impact journals, such as *Nature* or *Science*, China has shared a higher percentage of its research with the United States than vice versa. Still, the percentage of the US high-technology research shared with China has continuously increased over the past 10 years, while the percentage of high tech created in China that has been shared with the United States has been relatively stable.

Third, most TTP awardees in the United States are among the best Chinese researchers in the world, so the United States would lose a significant component of its

research strength should this group be chased back to China. Fourth, if STEM students, blocked from the United States, go to Europe or Japan, they are more likely to return to China than wind up working for US companies or universities. Fifth, collaborative research with a top cancer research country could end. Finally, according to ProPublica, investigations and prosecutions of scientists for nondisclosure, a violation previously handled within universities and often regarded as minor, is "helping China achieve a long-frustrated goal of luring back top scientific talent."

What can be done? Writing in 2014 in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* on the issue of scientific openness versus national security, Krige quoted a US government report of 2007 that argued that the only reasonable security policy is to protect only the most sensitive knowledge by building *high walls around small fields* rather than trying to build *nominal walls around large fields*. Thus the Department of Energy, which is responsible for the US nuclear program, was unwise to let nine Mainland-born Chinese researchers in the department join the TTP. On the other hand, the Biden administration must be judicious in pursuing policies that undermine global cooperation and the advancement of scientific and academic research. ◢

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The Global Ecosystem of Academe and Research Cooperation: Risks and Geopolitics

Mark S. Johnson

Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has illuminated and exacerbated "pressure cracks" within national higher educational systems, as well as emerging risks in the larger ecosystem of international higher education and research cooperation. These risks of geopolitical conflict and ethnonationalist politics could interact to generate powerful countercurrents to established student and scholar mobility and "knowledge diplomacy." Such rising barriers could, in turn, close off any meaningful hope of addressing our increasingly disruptive global emergencies.

T he COVID-19 pandemic will inevitably be seen as a transformational moment in contemporary processes of neoliberal globalization. Either the major powers and the international community will pull together around increasingly cooperative approaches to public health, biomedical research, and the sharing and distribution of new vaccine technologies, and the pandemic and its economic disruptions will subside. Or the international system will pull apart around those same fault lines, and new variants will continue to mutate and spread—with increasingly severe economic and political consequences.

Global Prospects and Scenario Planning for the Aftermath of COVID-19
Every four years, timed to inform the beginning of a new administration, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the National Intelligence Council engage in scenario planning for US national security policy in the context of anticipated global developments. In March 2021, the latest report was released as *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World* (Office of the Director of National Intelligence). The report analyzed the "expanding uncertainty" caused by the pandemic, as well as the profound demographic, environmental, economic, and technological changes that could lead to global "disequilibrium." Risks include new pandemics, deteriorating climate impacts, financial and debt crises, mass migration, cyberattacks, and worsening social inequalities.

The 2021 intelligence report laid out a spectrum of five "future scenarios" for the world until 2040 and beyond: from a "renaissance of democracies" (led by a revitalized United

States, if it is able to embark upon ambitious domestic renewal, renewed immigration, improved social cohesion, and greater equality); to "a world adrift" (especially without US leadership in international organizations, and marked by the neglect of common crises); to "competitive coexistence" (in which US–China competition, as well as common global challenges, are more or less successfully, if not optimally, managed); "separate silos" (in which the world system fragments into semifunctional, yet autarkic, economic and security blocs, but in which developing nations and the global poor are increasingly left behind); and the most ominous scenario, "tragedy and mobilization" (in which a cascading series of climate and food catastrophes drive desperate global cooperation, especially across Eurasia and Africa). In all of these scenarios, the United States will play an essential role—either through renewal and leadership, or decline and withdrawal.

The Vital Role of International Higher Education and Research Cooperation in Global "Adaptation"

 Looking back over the past 20 or 30 years, there have arguably been optimistic premises at the heart of most leading theories of neoliberal globalization in the tertiary sector: That self-interest and the benign pursuit of commercial and "market advantage" would tilt policies toward cooperation and open borders, and that the diversification of providers would expand access, opportunity, and equity. In these hopeful scenarios, all the major powers, in pursuit of their self-interest, would continue to allow ever-greater global academic mobility and the integration of their economies and research systems. Even more critical theories that stressed the hegemonic interests of Anglo-American and corporate "market leaders" assumed that the current global system was essentially stable and functional, at least for its leading institutional actors. Similarly, the literature about internationalization highlighted its intellectual and financial utility, but with perhaps too little attention to geopolitics and systemic risks.

Highlighting the fundamental necessity of adaptation and resilience, the 2021 DNI/NIC report concludes that "The most effective states are likely to be those that can build societal consensus and trust toward collective action on adaptation and harness the relative expertise, capabilities, and relationships of nonstate actors to complement state capacity." In other words, there is an absolutely vital role to be played in any of the more positive scenarios by the higher education sector as a whole, as well as by institutional leaders, researchers, scientists, and students. Either globally engaged educators and students can help lead and shape these processes of crosscultural integration and renewal through an ethos of social responsibility, principled knowledge diplomacy, and sustainability. Or these political shocks and dislocations could close off global academic mobility, multinational cooperation could be disrupted or obstructed, and nations and blocs could be left to fend for themselves in an increasingly dysfunctional world system, amid collapsing ecosystems and rapidly declining biodiversity.

New Technologies, Geopolitics, and Ethnonationalism: The Risks of Exclusion and Securitization

However, echoing the direr scenarios from the *Global Trends* report, I would argue that there are, in fact, numerous emerging fault-lines and profound systemic risks in contemporary tertiary systems, as well as in the larger ecosystem of international higher education. This multidimensional "world crisis" could disrupt or collapse the neoliberal policy consensus, limit or close off global mobility, and block vitally necessary research cooperation. There are multiple emerging and acute risks to such cooperation and mutually beneficial "knowledge diplomacy."

First, there has been a conspicuous failure to establish a new global regime for internet governance, which has contributed to the disruptive "weaponization" of social media, the ongoing fragmentation of the internet (in the name of "internet sovereignty"), and scandals around governments' penetration of digital platforms and the erosion of privacy safeguards.

Second, there has been a similar failure to agree on ethical and other regulatory standards for rapidly emerging "next generation" technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of things, robotics and automation, and synthetic biology. Most ominously, such technologies are also rapidly reshaping defense industries, which in

turn is reinforcing the policy agenda of exclusion and securitization. Global trade regimes and supply chains underneath these "disruptive" technologies have also been destabilized by the pandemic and its aftermath, and will suffer further shocks as AI and automation continue to sweep through the world economy—which will further disrupt labor markets and national electoral politics.

Third, the growth of ethnonationalism and pseudopopulism in the major powers threatens to lead to new restrictions on skilled migration and the flow of international students, along with increased surveillance of multinational research and university partnerships.

And finally, it is undeniable that great power competition has led to instances in which national security and intelligence services have "penetrated," or at least surveilled, exchanges and scholarship programs, or have expelled some donors and aid organizations. Such interventions threaten academic freedom and the perceived legitimacy and integrity of student visa programs, state-funded scholarships, and cooperative research.

Any one of these issues could generate a powerful "geostrategic countercurrent" to established mobility dynamics, and if they all worsen together and interact, it could trigger an escalating systemic crisis in higher education and research cooperation. Such barriers will, in turn, close off any meaningful hope of addressing the global emergencies that are already spurring exclusion and securitization. ◄

Great power competition has led to instances in which national security and intelligence services have "penetrated," or at least surveilled, exchanges and scholarship programs.

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9

Internationalization in Isolation: COVID-19 Implications

Daniela Crăciun and Ariane de Gayardon

Internationalization is consistently referred to as an umbrella term that covers any and all processes of incorporating an international dimension into the purpose, functions, and activities of higher education in the hope of achieving educational, societal, economic, and political goals. Yet, international mobility has long prevailed as the most prominent mechanism for advancing internationalization, and, consequently, it is the most researched. With the COVID-19 pandemic putting all mobility on hold, including academic mobility, the wise words of Sancho Panza in Cervantes' 1615 novel *Don Quixote*, "Do not venture all [your] eggs in one basket," have never been more pertinent.

To make matters worse, international mobility has never been a quixotic endeavor. It is far from being an inclusive process, as it only caters to the minority of students and staff that have the means and resources to be mobile. By doing so, it excludes a wide range of institutions that have few, if any, mobile students and staff. As a result, mobility stratifies universities based on their attractiveness for mobile students and staff, favors research-intensive universities, follows the "spatiality of knowledge," and divides countries along language policy lines. It also privileges developed economies and networked global cities centralizing knowledge. Thus, the focus on mobility as the core component of internationalization is not idealistic: It has created, and continues to perpetuate, an unequal, elitist system that follows economic rationales and bypasses the majority of students, staff, and institutions.

Abstract

When a global health crisis renders mobility impossible, making all universities *de facto* isolated and remote, researchers should look at ways to redefine and generalize internationalization while removing the exclusive focus on mobility. Learning from the "unusual suspects" of internationalization—i.e., institutions that were considered remote *before* the crisis—is a unique opportunity to move the focus away from student mobility and foster more sustainable and inclusive internationalization practices.

Mobility stratifies universities based on their attractiveness for mobile students and staff.

Never Let a Good Crisis Go to Waste

When a global pandemic was declared in March 2020, Altbach and de Wit called COVID-19 "the internationalization revolution that isn't." One and a half years later, their expectation that the corona crisis would not bring about dramatic medium-term transformations in higher education has been confirmed. Governments and universities are basically waiting it out. But, as Winston Churchill put it, we should never let a good crisis go to waste.

In particular, with no more mobility, many institutions have relegated internationalization to an afterthought. Yet, the COVID-19 crisis is the perfect opportunity to rethink internationalization in the absence of mobility, to design activities and reconsider curricula to allow for internationalized education on the home campus—i.e., internationalization at home. It is also the perfect crisis to think about increasing virtual connections when building international research projects, with the possibility of reaching out to every part of the world. Yet, none of that has happened in a systematic way.

One area in which the pandemic has had an impact is defining "remoteness." Oxford Languages found that, in 2019, the adjective "remote" mostly referred to village, island, or location. In 2020, it most commonly referred to learning, working, workforce, and instruction—showing a generalization of remoteness. The same is true in higher education: All universities became remote in 2020.

In an effort to propose a way forward for higher education internationalization that resists external shocks, we suggest paying greater attention to the internationalization strategies of universities that were remote/isolated prior to the global health crisis. These institutions have had to operate without almost any mobility and imagine different internationalization policies and strategies. Learning from these "unusual suspects" of internationalization is a unique opportunity to move the focus away from student mobility and foster more sustainable and inclusive internationalization practices.

What We Can Learn from the "Unusual" Suspects

Existing literature specifically discussing internationalization beyond mobility in isolated/remote contexts is rare, but promising. Case studies from sub-Saharan Africa, rural South Africa, the Balkans, and Siberia corroborate the claim that universities in these areas pursue internationalization in a deliberate manner, focusing on institutional cooperation and establishing a unique international profile. For example, universities in Siberia seek to boost their international visibility by highlighting, rather than hiding, their unique location. Using their rare ecosystem as a competitive advantage, Siberian universities promote themselves internationally through environmental and sustainability research, tackling global climate challenges.

While a supportive institutional environment is key to developing such internationalization strategies and practices, national policies also play a central role in steering the internationalization activities of these universities. At the national level, internationalization in isolated contexts has been linked to societal and academic objectives, not just economic ones. For instance, the island state of Mauritius has used internationalization to successfully increase access to education. To achieve this, Mauritius implemented regulations encouraging international universities to offer higher education locally and developed a framework to ensure the quality of programs and qualifications provided. Further research showcased at a Society for Research into Higher Education (SRHE) colloquium on higher education on small islands underlined how challenges posed by location lead to innovative practices. In turn, these solutions challenge the geographies and normative practices of the center–periphery framework, something that needs to be extended to the study of internationalization on a global scale.

These experiences encourage us to "de-center" internationalization. As the above examples show, when it comes to internationalization, institutions at the periphery do not just fall prey to mimetive, normative, or coercive isomorphism. As a result of their unique circumstances, they have had to design deliberate and innovative internationalization strategies, which, if studied, could become the norm in higher education. By contrast, institutions at the center are faced with the uncertain sustainability of academic mobility and could (should) be pushed to the periphery of internationalization research and practices.

Internationalization in Isolation: A Research Agenda
What is needed is a research agenda that provides a truly global account of internationalization strategies in remote or isolated universities. Moving beyond the "usual suspects" of internationalization to consider the experiences of universities in isolation will help to enrich our understanding of internationalization without perpetuating elitist strategies. It can uncover practices that benefit an array of higher education stakeholders, while being less vulnerable to external shocks. An inclusive internationalization research agenda, which takes advantage and notice of the unsustainability of mobility, could still very well transform the COVID-19 crisis into "the internationalization revolution that [is]."

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COVID-19 and Private Higher Education

Daniel C. Levy

Abstract
Significant and identifiable differences and similarities surface between private and public higher education regarding COVID-19 policies and impacts. The same holds for differences and similarities between different parts of the private sector. Whereas private institutions are on average at higher risk from COVID impacts, and demand-absorbing ones are predictably at the greatest risk, there are offsetting factors as well, including certain advantages regarding private-sector policy making autonomy and flexibility.

While much study of COVID-19 in higher education considers higher education generically, other studies distinguish and even compare phenomena within higher education (e.g., policies made by subnational units within a country). Surely another salient contrast warranting attention is that between private and public higher education. However marginal private higher education (PHE) may have been in parts of the world a half century ago, it is now prominent in each global region, and it holds a third of the total global enrollment.

The Context
We here address notable differences and similarities in private and public higher education policies for dealing with COVID and COVID's impact, attentive also to comparisons among different parts of PHE. We draw on preliminary analyses of 14 countries, along with subsequent global tracking. Notwithstanding significant national variation, we discern strong global patterns, broadly consistent with scholarship's general findings about PHE, private–public distinctiveness, and distinctiveness within PHE.

Policies
The question of *who makes COVID policy* illustrates such manifestations of general patterns. Government's hand is longer and stronger in directing the public (than the private) sector, and government tends to make rather uniform policy for the entire public sector. Private actors have much more say in making COVID policy in the private sector and, as different families, businesses, churches, and others largely run their own institutions, private-sector COVID policy making is much more decentralized and differentiated, usually to the institutional level. A closer look at the government's role also reveals several less obvious patterns. One is that, given how crucial the COVID crisis is to public health and economics, government policy inclines toward its more controlling tendencies regarding both sectors of higher education. In the public sector, faculty and student representatives have been less directly involved in (COVID) policy making than is the norm there. In the private sector, the powerful government extreme often reaches all the way to whether institutions can remain open. Certainly, regimes that are interventionist by nature have not refrained from imposing themselves on PHE COVID policy regarding, for example, what fees private institutions must return to students when

classes are not in person. China was among countries proscribing in advance collection of room and board fees and forcing private institutions to refund prorated room and board for the Spring 2020 term.

Often, however, governments do not command the private nearly as much as the public sector, allowing private institutions' autonomy to make their own varied decisions based on their own judgments about finance, health, and fairness, as in Japan. Private institutions worldwide have sometimes chosen to remain open or in person, while public counterparts are shut or only online. Meanwhile, although student and family pressure for relief targets both governments and individual universities, the emphasis naturally differs by sector, governments being more targeted regarding the public sector, and institutions in the private sector.

Along with greater decentralization of the policymaking process, PHE repeatedly demonstrates greater flexibility in responding to COVID. Public-sector policy responses are more restricted by civil service law, union rights, and a norm that what is done anywhere in the public sector must be standardized and equal throughout the sector. Perhaps the starkest contrast is to private institutions that are "semielite" (elite nationally but not internationally), as these characteristically have skilled professional management along with hierarchical governance power, both facilitating rapid action, including unpopular action. Yet even "demand-absorbing" PHE, emphatically nonelite, has repeatedly shown flexibility to respond to COVID. Again, hierarchical governance facilitates adjusting tuition fees and admissions quotas to suit perceived institutional needs, and the shift to online study has repeatedly proven easier in private than in public institutions.

Indeed, demand-absorbers have had some flexibility advantages over even semielite or high-level religious universities: Overwhelmingly part-time, their faculty are more easily jettisoned, permanently or temporarily, as are programs under enrollment stress, while laboratories, campuses, and other infrastructure are usually sparse, thus minimizing unshakable and costly burdens. Sometimes, the low academic standing of private nonelite institutions has meant a pre-COVID presence of online offerings, a head start in coping with COVID. Even in the United States, where private–public higher education differences are generally much less stark than elsewhere, PHE's greater flexibility on both the revenue and expenditure side has been notable.

Impacts

Why have Cassandra-like warnings (or sometimes unbridled glee!) about the wholesale collapse of PHE, or at least its nonelite subsector, generally not materialized?

Why have Cassandra-like warnings (or sometimes unbridled glee!) about the wholesale collapse of PHE, or at least its nonelite subsector, generally not materialized? The just-noted flexible private policy making is one reason. Another is that a depressed economy supplying fewer jobs drives otherwise likely workers to enroll as students, including at online and nonelite private institutions. As the depressed economy also depresses government budgets for higher education, cuts fall much less on PHE, as it depends much less on government subsidies; if sustained, public budget cuts could damage public university quality and spark disorder to the point that families flee to private semielite and religious universities.

Meanwhile, it has not taken long to see how depressed study abroad provides an increased applicant base for domestic semielite PHE, which often epitomizes US or other Western-oriented experience along with social and academic standing that the well-to-do otherwise seek abroad, and can well afford at home (e.g., in Vietnam). On the other hand, international study also reminds us of how so much COVID damage falls significantly on both sectors: Both semielite private universities and leading public universities have been hurt by the slowed flow of students from countries less developed than theirs. Japan thus saw fit to provide financial aid for international as well as domestic students—regardless of whether they study in private or public institutions. Study abroad also illustrates how so much about COVID impacts can be country specific; for example, France's PHE is particularly dependent on international students.

Notwithstanding all the variation, the early analysis of COVID impacts bolsters a clear lesson from accumulated study of PHE: Demand-absorbing institutions are the most vulnerable whenever demand for higher education overall slackens or declines. These are the institutions that offer only low status and low quality while charging fees easily

exceeding those at public counterparts. The broad COVID generalization (true across sectors) that negative impacts fall most heavily on higher education's low-income population and especially in low-income countries is epitomized in these countries' demand-absorbing institutions. As a major tuition differential is a nearly universal and major private–public difference, it is unsurprising that it makes a big differential impact in COVID, hitting PHE generally and demand-absorbing PHE particularly, as in India. Clientele is often unable to sustain financial setbacks and pay tuition. And of course, PHE suffers where its family, business, or church ownership suffers. That suffering is especially intense where PHE is bailed out less by government rescue programs than public higher education (though some private institutions receive funds from government rescue programs targeting businesses). Where emergency aid does include both sectors, it is sometimes subject to earlier termination in the private sector.

It is too soon to know what further policies will evolve or what the ultimate impacts of COVID-19 will be. Nonetheless, we do observe significant patterns both between private and public sectors and within the private sector that merit further tracking. ◢

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The Program for Research on Private Higher Education (PROPHE) regularly contributes articles to IHE.

13

COVID-19 in Turkey: Fewer Applications, More Enrollments

Oğuz Esen

Abstract
In Turkey, higher education has been significantly affected by the COVID-19 epidemic. In April 2020, face-to-face education was replaced by distance learning. In 2021, the overall atmosphere of uncertainty affected high school students' applications for admission and preferences, especially low-income students in their senior year, who either postponed their plans for higher education or opted for open education. Demand increased for open education, formal two-year vocational programs, and formal undergraduate education in private universities.

During the epidemic, the number of students enrolled in universities in Turkey increased by 242,647 compared to the previous year. The demand for higher education decreased in many other countries around the world due to the COVID-19 epidemic; therefore, it is important to understand why the situation is different in Turkey. The aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the impact of the epidemic on higher education, with a focus on Turkish higher education.

During the epidemic, there was intense debate on the extent to which the demand for higher education would be affected. It was thought that both health concerns and the economic crisis would negatively affect demand for higher education. In times of economic crisis, two opposing forces influence the demand for university. On the one hand, decreasing family income tends to reduce demand; on the other, the almost nonexistent opportunity cost of education tends to increase it.

This time, however, the situation is different. The economic crisis has been more severe and the measures taken to prevent the epidemic have increased inequalities. It was predicted that the widening of income inequality caused by the epidemic would reduce the demand for higher education for low-income groups and increase it for high-income groups. Considering the significant income inequality among higher education students in Turkey, the epidemic was expected to exacerbate existing inequality through reduced higher education demand.

Less Applications to the University Entrance Examination
The first step to entering Turkish higher education is the application for the university entrance exam. Within the Turkish education system, this is the only way to enter a university. Admissions are open to applicants from both general high schools and vocational high schools. Secondary education is mainly provided by three types of institutions: general high schools (public and private), vocational high schools, and religious

high schools. Low-income students are reportedly much more likely to be enrolled in vocational and religious high schools, compared to middle- and upper-income students.

The decrease in the number of applications for the university entrance exam in 2020 was 91,000, representing a 4 percent contraction. This brought to an end the trend of an average 4.4 percent increase over the previous five years.

Four different types of student apply to university exams. The first group consisting of general and vocational school seniors, and the second group, consisting of graduates who have never been accepted before, make up the largest proportion of applicants. In 2020, for instance, these two groups accounted for 75 percent of applicants. The remaining 25 percent consist of the third group, those who have previously graduated from a higher education institution, and the fourth group, students still continuing their education in a higher education institution.

Prior to the pandemic, most applications in the first group were from high school seniors. This changed in 2020, when the number of applications of "unplaced" graduates exceeded that of seniors. In fact, in 2020, seniors' applications fell below even the 2015 level. This change in trends is the first effect of the COVID-19 epidemic.

The decrease in the number of applicants from general high schools was negligible; in contrast, there was a remarkable 67 percent increase in the number of applicants from private high schools providing education in a foreign language. The number of applicants from religious high schools decreased by 5 percent, while the number of applicants from vocational high schools decreased more sharply, by 10 percent.

Increased Demand for Distance Education, Vocational Programs, and Private Universities

The second step for entering higher education is enrollment. In the 2020–2021 academic year, there were 1,609,913 new university enrollments, 53 percent for face-to-face education, and 47 percent for open education. Enrollments increased by 18 percent compared to the 2019–2020 academic year—well above the average of 2.7 percent over the previous five years.

- Formal vs. Open Education: In the 2020–2021 academic year, undergraduate enrollments increased by 113,338, a 16 percent growth from the previous year, of which 24 percent (27,112) applied for formal education, and the rest (76 percent) for open education.
- Formal Education: Public vs. Private Universities. There were 27,112 more enrollments in formal undergraduate education in the 2020–2021 academic year, and a 5.5 percent increase in face-to-face programs. Formal undergraduate enrollments in state universities increased by 4 percent, and in private universities, by 15 percent. Forty-four percent of this increase was due to enrollment in state universities, and 46 percent, to enrollments in private universities. This is a novel and interesting situation; half of the additional enrollment in undergraduate education came from private universities, which have become the primary source of the increase in demand for undergraduate programs.
- Two-Year Programs: In 2021, there were 23,567 more enrollments in face-to-face two-year programs, a 7 percent growth. Public and private universities have similar growth rates for face-to-face two-year programs, around 7–8 percent, but public universities account for 79 percent of all enrollments.
- Distance Education: In terms of distance education, in the 2020–2021 academic year, enrollment increased by 35 percent overall. Enrollment in vocational programs increased by 31 percent, and in undergraduate programs, by 39 percent. For distance education, these figures suggest the beginning of a new trend, given that in the 2019–2020 academic year, distance education vocational school enrollments increased by barely 2 percent, and undergraduate enrollments decreased by 5 percent.

Conclusion: Trends in Application and Acceptance Rates

The number of students taking university entrance exams fell during COVID-19. Compared to 2019, among all applicants, the largest decline in 2020 was in senior students of vocational and religious high schools. Applications from senior students decreased, while applications from graduated, but unplaced students increased, exceeding those of senior students for the first time. There was a decrease in senior student applications

from every type of school, but the greatest contraction was again in those from vocational high school students. Applications from senior students in general public high school showed a small increase, but the main increase was from private high schools providing education in a foreign language.

There were decreases in undergraduate placements of senior high school students, and in two-year vocational placements of vocational high school students. The year 2020 saw a continuation of the previous year's increase in the rate of undergraduate acceptance of unplaced general and vocational high school graduates, while the acceptance rate of high school graduates who had been preparing for the university exam was almost twice the rate of senior high school students.

However, the situation was reversed for vocational high school students. In other words, if vocational high school students, generally from lower-income families, fail to be accepted into a program in their senior high school year, their chances of entering university are reduced by half. University enrollments increased in undergraduate and two-year vocational programs, and but the main growth area was distance education. Open education and two-year vocational program enrollments increased in public universities, but private universities had a higher rate of increase in overall undergraduate enrollments.

The epidemic's greatest impact was on low-income students in their senior year, who either postponed their plans for transition to higher education or opted for open education. There was an increase in demand for both undergraduate and two-year vocational programs from those high school graduates who had retaken the university exam, and the increased demand for undergraduate programs in private universities was driven by applications from private high school students. As the effects of the epidemic continue to be felt, it can be predicted that these emerging trends will continue. ◢

The epidemic's greatest impact was on low-income students in their senior year, who either postponed their plans for transition to higher education or opted for open education.

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15

The Complexities of Engaging Africa's Academic Diaspora

Ayenachew A. Woldegiyorgis

Abstract
Many countries have policies to leverage the intellectual resources of their diaspora communities in various areas, including higher education. Institutional arrangements, incentive schemes, and implementation strategies have long been the focus of these policy initiatives. The impact of the interdependent microfactors that shape the motivation and experiences of diaspora academics in their engagement with institutions in home countries seems largely overlooked both in research and practice. This article highlights some of these factors.

In recent years, engaging the diaspora to leverage their intellectual resources has become a hot topic in higher education policy discussions. Many countries in Africa and elsewhere have developed policies to guide the broader engagement of their diasporas, while concerned government agencies and higher education institutions also craft strategies to enable the participation of diaspora intellectuals in academic, research and development, and innovation activities.

These policies and strategies, however, often focus on the circumstances and needs of the institutions on the receiving end of the relationship. They seem to lack—as does the literature on the subject—adequate accounting for the complexities and nuances in the experiences of the diaspora, which hold a significant bearing in shaping the decisions, nature, and persistence of their engagement.

Using the Ethiopian academic diaspora in the United States as a case, a study recently published by the author in the *International Journal of African Higher Education* explores some of these complex factors. The implications of the study have broader international relevance to how diaspora engagement in higher education is understood and how pertinent programs are designed and implemented in different contexts.

The notion that efforts directed to the home country are far more meaningful and rewarding is a key factor in transnational diaspora engagement in higher education.

Sense of Debt

Having received free education in their country of birth and being privileged to pursue studies and career in an advanced system, many in the diaspora carry a sense of debt and of duty to give back. Early age inculcations of the values of "love for one's country" and patriotism lay the foundation for this sense of responsibility. The experience of having studied in extremely resource-constrained environments, compared with the abundance observed in their country of residence, further reinforces the aspiration to help create a better learning environment for the new generation of students back home. Continued social and cultural connections with their home country also present frequent opportunities to witness the struggle of higher education—making considerable progress, yet constrained by many factors—which, in turn, strengthens the urge to contribute to its improvement.

Outcomes of Engagement

The anticipated and realized achievements of engagement efforts constitute another set of factors that shape the nature and persistence of engagement. Outcomes expressed by such measures, such as the number of graduate students advised, the number of training sessions and people trained, the classes taught, the resources mobilized, and successful conferences and seminars organized, all underpin continued commitment, as much as they offer critical input for improving engagement efforts.

On the other hand, the notion that efforts directed to the home country are far more meaningful and rewarding is a key factor in transnational diaspora engagement in higher education. This notion is explained not only by the satisfaction derived from fulfilling the perceived duties discussed above, but also from the understanding that, for many, their field of expertise remains largely "embryonic" in their home countries. Therefore, small efforts can make a significant difference, compared to the well-established academic scene in their countries of residence, where opportunities for making a recognizable contribution are limited.

However, it is worth acknowledging that efforts by diaspora academics could also have hefty emotional and social costs, in addition to an economic one. The common case of academics going above and beyond to mobilize colleagues in their institutions and networks to organize such activities as research seminars and panel discussions, only to have a turnout that causes them social and professional embarrassment is a typical example. Similarly, it is not uncommon for engagement relationships to be a source of tension and even conflict. Such outcomes—both positive and negative—determine the success and continuity, or lack thereof, of engagement.

Racial Relations in the Home Institution

Whether it comes in the form of blatant discriminatory practices or subtle microaggressions, an unpleasant racial environment in the institutions where diaspora academics work has implications for transnational engagement in one of two ways.

Some state that their abilities are undermined, and their competencies routinely questioned, so that they have to prove themselves over and over again. This calls for them to put in much more effort than their colleagues to achieve the same in their careers. This burden of extra hard work and overconsumption of their emotional capital leaves them with little to no time and energy to spare for work with their home country and its institutions.

Others maintain that the racially charged environment in their institutions is full of constant reminders that they do not belong. Those signals of alienation push them to seek emotional refuge in their connection with their home countries. This, among other things, manifests itself in strengthening their relationships with colleagues and institutions in their country of origin, hence positively contributing to their professional engagement. This sentiment has become increasingly common with the rise of exclusionary nationalistic rhetoric in many parts of the world.

Personal Circumstances

The personal circumstances of the individual academic take a central position in the analysis of critical factors that shape and predict the success and continuity of transnational diasporic engagement. Schooling of children is, for instance, one of the most salient factors that determine availability of time and flexibility, particularly to travel for in-person engagement. Those with school-age children often tend to have a well-established routine with narrow scope for traveling. A critical enabling factor in this regard is, of course, the nature of the occupation of a spouse.

It is, however, worth noting that with the recent upward trend in virtual engagement, these factors are becoming less relevant than before. Activities like advising graduate students or occasionally conducting seminars are preferred for their flexibility, compared to more structured engagements like teaching courses or conducting major research projects.

Financial stability and the opportunity cost of time that could have been spent on income generating activities, such as grant writing, also have a crucial role. Grant writing is in fact identified as having a double perk—both financially and career-wise. Therefore, particularly for early career academics and researchers, diasporic engagement could appear as competing with these important endeavors. Robust approaches that encourage the inclusion of certain elements of diasporic engagement in these activities could easily address this predicament.

On the other hand, factors such as the philosophy and strategy of institutions regarding international engagement, the availability of support and resources at department/school level, and the burden of administrative responsibility account for the extent to which effective and sustainable diasporic engagement is possible.

Flexible Programming

A careful consideration of these factors and their complex interplay is key to tapping into the intellectual resources of the diaspora. A reasonable balance between flexibility on one hand, and accountable and efficient administration on the other, is important in setting policies and institutional arrangements. Programming needs to pay attention to possible nuances in experiences and circumstances (personal, familial, and institutional) on the part of the diaspora, in the same way as it takes note of broader factors such as disciplinary differences and academic calendars. ◢

17

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Universities and Labor Market Mismatch in Kenya

Ishmael I. Munene

Abstract

A nagging policy issue, graduate unemployment in Africa, is a concern among stakeholders. In Kenya, in-built institutional inhibitions and failed reforms explain the mismatch between the labor market and university programs. Some modest reforms and alternative pathways for tertiary education, however, offer a ray of hope.

Though studies have demonstrated a strong link between higher education and employment, unemployment is a ticking time bomb in Africa, with university graduates on long-term unemployment approaching 50 percent. This raises questions about the nature of university education and labor market needs on the continent. Although, in this article, the focus is on Kenya, the issues raised and reforms suggested are of great relevance for university education and employment in Africa in general.

Recently, the Teachers Service Commission (TSC), the employer of public school teachers, stated that it would not hire bachelor of education graduates. Meanwhile, universities offer a new teacher training program in which trainees complete degrees in their

subject expertise areas, followed by a one-year postgraduate teaching diploma. A few weeks later, the Commission for University Education ordered professional associations to obey court orders and cease accrediting university academic programs. These actions are a proxy for perceived labor market deficiencies of university graduates.

University–Labor Market Disarticulation

To a large degree, unemployment is tied to economic performance. A severe economic downturn can have a devastating effect on employment for graduates from a high-skill focused curriculum. However, in a context like Kenya, where economic performance has been relatively good, unemployment is attributed to factors internal to education, as the conundrum of graduate unemployment illustrates.

The 2020 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics reported that youth aged 20 to 29, the age bracket of fresh university graduates, had an unemployment rate of over 32.4 percent, with a long-time unemployment rate of 7.9 percent. The era of guaranteed white-collar employment for university graduates has waned in the last two decades, with many going through years of unemployment and underemployment. Even high-demand professional disciplines such as the medical sciences, engineering, technology, and business have not been spared the scourge of unemployment.

Stakeholders attribute the source of the problem to the mismatch between academic programs and labor market needs. This mismatch is attributed to three major causes: inordinate focus on academics rather than employment needs in program development; emphasis on government as the main source of employment; and nonexistent, or inadequate, career advisory services.

While the government has premised the development of universities—public and private—on manpower needs, their actual establishment focuses on academic programs requirements. With the exception of the five top public universities (Nairobi University, Kenyatta University, Moi University, Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, and Egerton University), established after a considerable assessment of the government's manpower needs, the remaining 72 public and private universities were founded without any assessment of the labor market needs of the national economy. Other considerations such as politics and religious affiliation have been the drivers of university expansions. Within one year, between 2012 and 2013, 23 of the 38 public universities were established to satisfy political demands for universities by various ethnic groups. Today, nearly all major religious denominations have a university, which is the main driver of private university growth. A common feature of recently founded universities is academic programs that have minimal bearing on direct employment, including humanities, social sciences, basic sciences, and communications.

Though the logic of manpower development is rational, extant academic programs in the universities rarely promote employability. Whether universities should focus on creating employable graduates or transmitting knowledge remains to be settled, but the reality of life after graduation requires some focus on skills deemed desirable by potential employers. Kenyan employers deplore the lack of job skills among graduates. The 2018 Kenya Federation of Employers survey noted that 64 percent of university graduates lacked skills needed by employers, including critical thinking, analytical minds, creativity, teamwork, communication, and writing skills. The ability of graduates to be job creators is a crucial issue for stakeholders, yet entrepreneurship hardly features in academic programs, rendering this goal unattainable.

The antiquated legacy of government as the main employer is embedded in most academic programs.

The antiquated legacy of government as the main employer is embedded in most academic programs. Agriculture, veterinary, forestry, public administration, economics, and education are some of the course programs that were created to respond to the state's manpower needs in the 1960s. The state ceased to be the main employer of graduates nearly 20 years ago, yet the content of programs does not reflect this reality. The TSC, the government agency that hires teachers for public schools, has openings for 100,000 teachers. However, in 2020, budgetary constraints only allowed it to hire 12,000 teachers. It only hired teachers who graduated in 2015. Nevertheless, 56 (74 percent) of the 77 universities are in the teacher training business.

Career advisory services support employment prospects by equipping students with practical knowledge and a solid foundation to enter the job market. Besides providing

internship opportunities, well-staffed career centers support students in interview and résumé preparation and communication improvement. Yet robust career services with career specialists are a missing link in most of Kenya's universities. The Office of Career Services at the University of Nairobi, the country's premier university, has a professional staff of two for a student enrollment of 77,000.

Reforms That Never Were

There have been educational reforms to address the problem of unemployment, but these reforms have not targeted universities in a transformative way. The first education commission after independence, the 1964 Ominde Education Commission, made recommendations centered on national unity, human capital production, and wealth creation. The 1985 McKay Commission that introduced 8–4–4 reforms focused on giving students practical skills in agriculture, trades, and creative arts that would easily translate into the labor market. The 2017 Competency-Based Curriculum reform overhauled the elementary and secondary education curriculum to develop student competencies in deep mastery of content, critical thinking, and complex problem-solving, etc., to make them nimble.

The government has ensured structural and curricular reforms in the school system to attain the commissions' recommendations. The dictates of autonomy and academic freedom has meant that universities could reform their curricula along with policy recommendations at their own discretion. This, however, has not been the case. Universities have only tinkered with the years of study at the undergraduate level, while leaving their curricula intact.

All Is not Lost

The need to improve the situation has dawned on university authorities and policy makers. Universities have begun to explore corrective measures, albeit in limited ways. It is common to see university websites listing career prospects for graduates of each program and prominent professionals in the field. Some universities now offer entrepreneurship degree programs to strengthen the message of job creation upon graduation. New labor market-focused programs such as tourism, restaurant management, and policy studies are now offered in the newer universities.

Following promotion from the state about the excellent employment prospects of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) graduates, TVET colleges have gained in popularity. Nearly all TVET college graduates enter employment upon graduation, or start their own enterprises. The TVET Authority sets policy, accredits the colleges, and offers regulatory oversight to ensure the quality of training programs. Further, students enrolled in these colleges are eligible for state financial sponsorship through the Higher Education Loans Board. So successful has TVET become, that 10 percent of students admitted to universities have elected to enroll in TVET colleges instead. The reputation of universities as avenues of guaranteed employment is losing its shine. ◢

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Why Latin America Needs World-Class Universities

Philip G. Altbach and Jamil Salmi

Abstract

Latin America's research universities have underperformed, and the region has few world-class institutions. For Latin America to thrive in the twenty-first century, it needs high quality universities. We argue that this is in part because of the "Cordoba academic revolution" and its academic ideas. The great public universities in Latin America need reform.

Along with Africa, Latin America is the continent with the fewest top quality research-intensive universities. No Latin American university is listed in the top 100, and relatively few Latin American scholars and scientists are found among the most highly cited academics. Latin America represents 8.5 percent of the world population and produces 8.7 percent of the planet's GDP, but its universities account for only 1.6 percent of the top 500 institutions in the Shanghai ranking and less than 1.5 percent of the top 400 in the *Times Higher Education* ranking. This is a serious deficiency if the continent wants to produce quality research and innovation and share in the science-driven progress of the twenty-first century, especially in the present times of pandemic.

One of the main reasons is the underperformance of the great public universities that emerged from the "Cordoba higher education revolution" of 1918. It is worth examining why this is the case as a prerequisite to improvement.

The Ideals and Realities of the "Cordoba" Universities

The Cordoba revolution, started in Argentina in 1918 by students eager to democratize and modernize the university, led to the development of large public comprehensive universities throughout the continent and cemented the model of public higher education up to the present, making change very difficult.

At the risk of oversimplifying, the Cordoba principles can be summarized in the following way. Universities have an important role to play, educating students who can participate in nation-building and providing research and service to contribute to national development efforts. With the ideal of providing equal access, universities do not charge tuition and generally admit students based on transparent and common criteria (either secondary school completion or competitive university entrance examinations). As a protection from authoritarian regimes, universities should be autonomous: free of direct government control, with academic freedom guaranteed, but at the same time funded by the state. Internally, universities should be governed democratically—including faculty, students, and sometimes administrative personnel involved in decision-making and electing key academic leaders.

Throughout Latin America, public universities influenced by the Cordoba model came to dominate academe and remain the key institutions today, largely unchanged in the past century. Even with massification, the growth of the private sector (in many Latin American countries, more than half of the enrollments are in private higher education), and considerable institutional diversification, the "Cordoba universities" remain the gold standard. Several have become megauniversities, and many are the most prominent producers of locally relevant research in the country. For example, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the largest in the region, has 350,000 students, some in affiliated secondary schools. The University of Buenos Aires (UBA) enrolls 309,000 students.

The situation has been further exacerbated by low levels of public funding for higher education in most Latin American countries, lack of long-term continuity in national higher education policies due to political instability, and sometimes negative views toward the scientific mission of universities, as illustrated by the adversary policies of the Bolsonaro administration in Brazil.

The Governance Challenges of the Cordoba Universities

The case of the University of São Paulo, Brazil's top university, illustrates well the governance limitations of many public universities in Latin America, unable to evolve rapidly with the flexibility characterizing flagship institutions elsewhere. It has the highest number of top-rated graduate programs in the country, annually produces more PhD graduates than any US university, produces pertinent research for the country, and is the highest-financed public university in Latin America. Yet its ability to manage its resources is severely constrained by rigid civil service regulations. It has few linkages with the international research community; only 3 percent of its graduate students are from outside Brazil, and the majority of professors are themselves USP graduates.

The key missing element is a vision of excellence to challenge the status quo and transform the university. This is reinforced by a system of democratic election of university leaders promoting clientelism and frequent turnover of leaders, a large internal university council that makes the decision-making process unwieldy, and an egalitarian academic culture that frowns upon recognizing and rewarding outstanding researchers and teachers. In Brazil, as in many countries in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, the lack of strategic ambition for the development of higher education can often be observed as much at the national government level as among the university leadership.

What Could Be Done

The transformation of Latin America's public universities would, without doubt, require a second "Cordoba revolution," driven by a bold vision from the academic community and substantial support and resources from government. This would involve the following changes:

- Substantial increases in public funding: Today, research funding is between 0.3 and 1 percent of annual GDP, way below the levels of investment in Nordic countries and East Asian nations.
- A continuous focus on national service and the UN Sustainable Development Goals: One of the strengths of the traditional "Cordoba universities" has been their commitment to national and social development. It is essential to retain this tradition and vision.
- A modern governance setup that allows for the professional selection of university leaders, internationally—a practice that, ironically, is acceptable when it comes to choosing the trainer of the national soccer team but is viewed as sacrilegious for universities. Universities are complex institutions that require a balance of professional and academic management and leadership.
- Autonomy and academic freedom, coupled with accountability to the government, the main funding source, and to society.
- Manageable size: Most world-class universities have enrollments of 40,000 students or fewer, and a fairly comprehensive array of academic programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.
- Interdisciplinarity: Flagship universities have structures and incentives that encourage and enable teaching and research across disciplines. This is notably lacking in many Latin American universities.
- Internationalization: Latin American universities generally lag behind their global peers in international connections, collaborative scholarship and research, and mobility. All aspects of internationalization are important, including increased attention to the use of English for international mobility and collaborative research, as long as it remains the main medium of global science and scholarship.

Our argument is not an academic exercise, but an invitation to governments and institutional leaders to think about the development role of their universities in the twenty-first century. Latin America deserves to have first-rate universities that can engage with global science through leading-edge fundamental and applied research, train ethically minded citizens and professionals, and contribute to the sustainable development of LAC societies. One thing is clear: However innovative and successful a century ago, the model of the traditional "Cordoba universities" is no longer adequate and should be revisited. Another revolution is needed, this time not a common template as Cordoba proposed, but rather in the form of innovative ideas and courageous initiatives suited to each country's national needs and aspirations. ◢

The key missing element is a vision of excellence to challenge the status quo and transform the university.

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Electing a Rector in Brazil: Complicated Politics

Marcelo Knobel

22

Abstract
This article describes the succession process of the president (rector) of one of the most important public universities in Brazil. Although each public higher education institution in Latin America has a different election system, general patterns apply. The intricate election system that precedes formal appointment has positive and negative facets, which are important arguments in the discussion on improving governance—so necessary not only in public Latin American universities, but also worldwide.

The list is the outcome of an election in which the entire academic community participates.

The University of Campinas (Universidade Estadual de Campinas, best known as Unicamp), is a state-funded, comprehensive university, ranked among the best in Latin America. Its governance system is similar to most public universities in Brazil, in which a president (rector) selects an administrative team. There is a university council (UC), presided over by the rector, with the participation of all the administrative principals, the directors of the different schools and institutes, and elected representatives from the academic community (students, staff, and faculty). Currently, this council has 76 members—with 70 percent among them faculty.

In most higher education institutions (HEIs) worldwide, the president is a professional selected through a search process and charged with implementing strategies and actions approved by a council or a board, over which she or he does not preside. In Brazil, the rector is a professor who presides over the university council, which in turn decides the policies of the university, giving rise to an inherent ambiguity and excess of power.

The Election Process
The rector of the university is appointed by the governor of São Paulo state for a four-year term without the possibility of reelection. Only full professors at the university are eligible. The finalist is selected from a list of three candidates prepared by the UC. The list is the outcome of an election in which the entire academic community participates. Each university might have a different system, ranging from full parity of all sectors to the election of representatives who constitute an electoral college. At Unicamp, each member of the community is entitled to vote for the rector, but the votes from each sector are weighted differently, with greater weight given to the votes of the faculty (votes from faculty count for three-fifths, votes from staff for one-fifth, and votes from students for one-fifth as well). If none of the candidates achieves more than 50 percent of the weighted votes, there is a second round. The UC creates the list submitted to the governor based on the results of the election.

There is always a certain amount of tension resulting from formal appointments made by governors for state institutions, or by the country´s president in the case of federal universities. Since the country's return to democracy, the practice has been that the executive authority appoints the first name on the list, respecting the choice of the university community. However, since 2019, the current president, Jair Bolsonaro, has appointed rectors of federal universities dismissing the institutional choice in 20 out of 54 elections. In two cases, the president's choice was not even on the list. Even though there is no legal obligation for appointments to originate from the list submitted, accepting the academic community's preference is considered an important expression of respect of the autonomy of universities, of democracy, and of the legitimacy of the process. Administrative leadership by a person who was not chosen by the majority of the university community has only served to exacerbate tensions within the academic environment. In several cases, the result has been long strikes and conflicts that may require years to heal.

Considering the complexity of the election process, preparation starts long before election day. A committee is formed by the UC to determine the calendar, rules, and logistics of the ballot and the process for counting votes. (In 2021, the entire process at Unicamp was completely online, with around 35,000 voters.) Also, candidates start their campaign well in advance to exchange ideas with the community by participating in group discussions, interviews, debates, not unlike a campaign in a small town. Earning support from different constituencies, identifying future threats, and developing possible institutional strategies are essential steps in the preparation of a comprehensive agenda for the

forthcoming term. A well-organized communication strategy is also critical, with presence on social media to reach the entire community. Each candidate is helped by supporters who work on a volunteer basis, helping to elaborate the candidate's program, organize the schedule of visits, and contribute financially as needed. This support group eventually becomes a part of the administration team if their candidate wins the election.

Candidates usually represent groups within the university with different priorities and objectives that are, or at least should be, clearly stated throughout the campaign. A rather diverse mix of issues emerge during conversations and debates, including academic policy and practice, infrastructure problems, bureaucracy, salaries, etc. Other specific interest groups, including political parties, unions, student representatives, among others, eventually choose one of the candidates whom they support. Sadly, personal attacks and fake news have become increasingly prevalent, amplified in social media and message groups by malicious anonymous individuals. Since the campaign takes place exclusively among local candidates, they usually indulge in shallow discussions of internal issues, while missing the fundamental connection to the society that the university ultimately serves.

Advantages and Limitations of the System

The overall process has pros and cons. The candidates must necessarily be full professors at the university, which strongly limits opportunities for potentially good candidates with the necessary administrative skills and academic backgrounds who might come from another university or even a different sector. Nonetheless, to eventually make a change in order to attract candidates with different profiles, it would be necessary to modify conditions, most importantly, to the salary and duration of the term. As a matter of fact, there is no additional salary for the rector, rather an additional dividend that in the case of Unicamp is currently around USD 1,200 per month. Also, the four-year term is too short for robust changes or projects. The restriction on a rector from serving a consecutive second term brings instability to university programs, as agendas can change dramatically every four years. This hinders the execution of policy changes that might take years to be fully implemented or that could be perceived as unpopular and, as a result, limit the chances of a like-minded successor to be elected.

In fact, there is always the likelihood of major policy shifts each quadrennium. Populist speeches might make promises to attract votes from specific groups within the university. If implemented, some of these pledges may jeopardize the financial stability of the university or discontinue important initiatives.

The campaign period offers candidates a deeper understanding of the problems faced by different sectors. The participation of staff and students guarantees that all sectors actively engage in the process and have an opportunity to express their concerns. The candidates must develop their plan of action in advance and these discussions help to build a stronger piece.

Generally speaking, the governance of public universities in Brazil (and Latin America) has a great deal of room to improve, but it has valuable elements that should be preserved. A better system might consider practices followed elsewhere to identify university leadership, including search committees to select qualified professionals from inside or outside the university. It might also guarantee broader participation from different sectors of society. This would weaken the pattern of promises, expectations, and "return of favors" following the campaign, which might compromise plans of action. On the other hand, the participation of the whole university community in the election, as well as the deep discussions that occur during the campaign are healthy practices that should be preserved in an improved governance system, which ultimately would support the role of the university as a public good. ◢

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Disclaimer: The author participated twice in the election process.

Too Many People Left Behind: The Crucial Importance of TVET

Ellen Hazelkorn

Abstract

Have we given as much attention to people who do not attend college and university as to those who do? Assumptions that massification would, on its own, provide opportunities for everyone are being heavily questioned. Technical and vocational education and training colleges and polytechnics are increasingly acknowledged as playing an indispensable role in post-18 years' education. Many countries are going further—reframing policy discussion around tertiary education, inclusive of formal, non-formal, "second-chance," and life-long learning.

24

Despite costs associated with participation, people with a higher education qualification do better in the labor market and in life chances over the longer term.

Recent decades have seen significant policy success increasing the numbers of young people attending and successfully completing higher education. According to _Education at a Glance_ 2020, across OECD countries, 45 percent of 25–34-year-olds have participated in higher education, compared with only 28.4 percent of 55–64-year-olds—although this varies across countries. This is likely to increase to 49 percent over the next years. Despite costs associated with participation, people with a higher education qualification do better in the labor market and in life chances over the longer term. But what about the other 50 percent? Have we given as much attention to people who do not attend university?

Hyperglobalization, demographic change, the climate crisis, and the technological revolution—plus changes accruing from the COVID-19 pandemic—are all dramatically reshaping the world of work and how and where we live. In addition to the adage that people will work in jobs that we do not even know about now, the workforce itself will become more diverse, with a greater range of ages, more women, and more ethnic diversity. According to CEDEFOP, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, higher skills will constitute 41 percent of the skills mix required by 2030 and almost 45 percent of jobs will require medium-level skills. Yet, on average across OECD countries, almost 39 percent of 25–29-year-olds are classified as NEETs—neither employed nor in education or training.

These developments, and the resulting rise in populism and social unrest, are forcing policy makers to focus on long-standing weaknesses in their education and training systems. Assumptions that massification would _on its own_ provide opportunities for everyone with mechanisms for social inclusion and mobility are being heavily questioned, and entry routes are now seen as just as likely to close off educational and career opportunities as to open them. In contrast to an overemphasis on high-status resource-intensive research universities, attention is turning those left behind. After all, the top 100 universities listed by the Academic Ranking of World Universities (2019) represent only 1.4 percent of total student numbers worldwide.

What is Nonuniversity/TVET?

Various terms are used to describe or define postsecondary education. Governments have often allowed their liberal market or coordinated binary systems to carve out distinctive educational pathways, with each preparing graduates for different occupational destinations. In the 1970s, UNESCO developed the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) as a framework to differentiate between shorter practical, technical, or occupational skill-focused and longer theoretical programs. ISCED was subsequently revised in 1997 and again in 2011.

Higher education (ISCED 6–8) is clearly delineated by internationally recognized qualifications (bachelor, master, doctorate) offered primarily by universities. In contrast, provision of, and attitudes to, the "nonuniversity" sector vary considerably. The nomenclature itself illustrates the extent to which public discourse and policy have often framed these institutions, and their students, as "the other."

There are different types of credentials associated with ISCED levels 4 and 5, usually with little recognition outside their country. Provision ranges from countries with high standardization, strong track differentiation, and linkages between education and the labor market, to countries with much weaker track differentiation and school–to–work linkages.

Germany, for example, stresses parity of esteem between vocational and academic education. In Australia and Ireland, dual-sector institutions have been established

providing vocational/professional education from ISCED 5 to 8. Community colleges in the United States focus on workforce preparation, preparing students for their first job or retraining, upgrading, assisting owners of small businesses, or helping communities with economic development planning. In jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, further education is seen primarily as a feeder into university, leading to predatory behavior between universities and colleges.

Nonuniversity/TVET (technical and vocational education and training) institutions provide pathways to well-paying careers as well as an entry into higher levels of education for those who wish to pursue further study. Yet, in many countries, sociocultural and policy factors have meant that these institutions have relatively low status and receive considerably less funding and resources than universities.

Reframing Postsecondary Education as Tertiary Education

Operating under different names, TVET colleges and polytechnics and similar institutions are increasingly acknowledged as playing an indispensable role in post-18-years' education. Many countries are going further—reframing policy discussion around tertiary education, inclusive of formal, nonformal, "second-chance," and life-long learning. Objectives envisage a more integrated set of learning pathways and networks of colleges and universities providing both knowledge and skills with greater labor market relevance and emphasis on work-based and work-informed learning.

Changes are also affecting apprenticeship education, which has traditionally been provided in technical schools at secondary level. Redesigned for the twenty-first century, it retains the "earn–learn" model but now embraces computing, data analytics, advanced manufacturing, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and more, in addition to traditional fields such as construction, automotive, etc. Countries are taking different approaches, but what is clear is that postsecondary "nonuniversity" education is taking centre stage. An early innovator, New Zealand established the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (TEAC) in 2000. It adopted a broad definition of tertiary education, bringing all private and government training establishments, business-based education, industry training, and all lifelong learning beyond the compulsory school system under the remit of the Tertiary Education Commission (TEC). Wales is moving in the same direction with legislation prepared to establish the Commission for Tertiary Education and Research (CTER). Ireland has brought further education and higher education together in one dedicated ministry.

Singapore's Skills Future provides a universal set of education and training programs for students, early and mid-career employees and "silver years," and employers, developed as part of its Singapore Skills Framework. It involves a wide range of postsecondary providers, including polytechnics. Brazil's federal network of vocational, scientific, and technological education institutions brings together more than 40 different institutions. Ethiopia has identified TVET as a national priority playing a key role in the transformation from an agricultural-based economy to a dynamic, industry-led internationalized economy. US President Obama, and now President Biden, propose making two years of community college free.

The European Union launched the Centres of Vocational Excellence initiative, placing vocational education and training at the heart of a skills ecosystem contributing to regional, economic, and social development and innovation. In the United Kingdom, the Commission on the College of the Future published several reports setting out a similar agenda for postsecondary colleges. At the international level, there is the UNESCO International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (UNEVOC) and CEDEFOP.

Changing Profile of Vocational Education and Training

Too often dismissed or ignored in the rush toward universal higher education, or seen as a cheap(er) option, postsecondary education/TVET is now recognized as an essential component of the (tertiary) education system and the broader ecosystem. This is because it encompasses skill development as well as innovation diffusion and applied research—which together can have a more direct impact on sustainable social, cultural, and economic growth, especially in less developed regions. It responds to needs for reskilling and upskilling and can contribute to addressing demographic challenges—in

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addition to its powerful role and social responsibility in working with disadvantaged and underserved communities. The objective of creating a coherent tertiary system, encompassing different types of educational providers working collaboratively, each aiming to be best in class, is an idea whose time has finally come. ◄

Declining Enrollments in Community Colleges: America's Economic Divide

Anthony P. Carnevale

26

Abstract
Enrollment at US community colleges plunged during the COVID-19 pandemic. The enrollment decline is a particularly devastating setback for workers, because of how valuable postsecondary education has become in the US labor market. This highlights the growing divide in the United States between those with postsecondary education and those without it.

The US labor market is going through a period of profound change, as more jobs require postsecondary education and workers struggle to adjust. While previous recessions led unemployed or underemployed workers to flock to community colleges to upskill or reskill, that was not the case during the COVID-19 recession. Enrollment at these two-year public colleges decreased by a stunning 10 percent in Fall 2020 and 9.5 percent in Spring 2021 from previous years.

Our research shows that this shift had the greatest impact on individuals from low-income households and those who were planning to pursue certificates or associate's degrees. Households in which individuals intended to take classes in a certificate or associate's degree program were the most likely to cancel their college plans entirely. That may be because their program did not translate to a virtual environment. Some certificates and associate's degrees require hands-on experience that is difficult to replicate online. In other cases, access to technology at home may have posed a challenge for students who had to shift to a virtual classroom unexpectedly. In addition, job loss and other financial difficulties brought on by the recession may have made it difficult for students to pursue their education as planned, as many work while they are enrolled to cover their tuition and other expenses.

A Growing Divide

The enrollment decline at community colleges is a particularly devastating setback for workers because of how valuable postsecondary education has become in the US labor market. Although earnings vary by program of study, in general workers can expect to earn more with each additional level of education. Bachelor degree holders earn a median 74 percent more over their lifetimes than those with no more than a high school diploma.

These changes are only exacerbating the divide by race and class in US higher education.

These changes are only exacerbating the divide by race and class in US higher education. Higher-income households and those with students in bachelor or graduate degree programs were less likely to report changing their plans at all, and, when they did, a majority reported taking classes in a different format rather than canceling their plans to take classes altogether.

The US higher education system already had two separate and unequal tracks before the COVID-19 pandemic: one at well-funded, four-year colleges that tend to enroll affluent white students, and another at overcrowded and underfunded open-access two-year public colleges, which are mostly community colleges. (Community colleges disproportionately enroll Black and Latino students, as well as low-income white students.) Because of its growing role in individuals' economic success, the US postsecondary education system is now a gearwheel in the country's race and class inequality machine.

With selective four-year colleges spending almost three times as much on instructional and academic support as community colleges, it is no surprise that the students who attend selective colleges are more likely to graduate. Higher education mimics and magnifies the inequality that it inherits from the pre-K–12 education system, then projects this inequality into labor markets, transmitting race and class privilege across generations.

The Future of Community Colleges
The unexpected drop in community college enrollment during the COVID-19 pandemic foreshadows the future college enrollment crisis. The number of US high school graduates is expected to increase from roughly 3.8 million students in 2020 to about 3.9 million in 2025, then fall to 3.5 million students by 2037. This trend will reinforce the higher education divide in the United States. For community colleges and other nonselective colleges, the shrinking college-age population will lead to declining enrollment. For selective colleges, however, the growth in families with two parents with bachelor degrees—and the wealth that comes with being college educated—will increase the size of applicant pools. Ultimately, we can expect downsizing, mergers, and closures at nonselective colleges, while selective colleges continue to thrive.

Two major policy proposals also stand to affect the future of US community colleges and their students: a federal infrastructure jobs plan and tuition-free community college. It is unclear whether and when these proposals will be enacted, and, if they are, what provisions will be included. However, we need to ensure that these major policy proposals do not lead to new forms of race, class, and gender tracking.

More than half of the 15 million infrastructure jobs created under the American Jobs Plan over 10 years would be available to workers with a high school diploma or less, who may only need short-term training to fill those jobs. We expect that the infrastructure bill would steer mostly young men, who traditionally fill infrastructure jobs, to training programs at community colleges. When the infrastructure program eventually ends, however, many of these workers may be displaced, at least in the short term.

If a free community college program were enacted in the United States, students who are low-income or from disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups will likely become more concentrated at these colleges. All the while, affluent white students will continue to be concentrated in four-year schools, where they are more likely to obtain a bachelor degree and the increased earnings that tend to come with it.

Policy Recommendations
We can take action to help bridge this growing chasm between haves and have-nots in higher education. By strengthening pathways from high school to community college and community college to the bachelor degree, we can ensure that more students have access to the most reliable ticket to the middle class. Policies that improve access to bachelor degrees, such as allowing community colleges to award bachelor degrees, have already been implemented in about half of the states in the United States. Some states are also mandating higher transfer rates from community colleges to four-year public colleges. Changes like these are important to help low-income and underserved minority students earn bachelor degrees, rather than being tracked into postsecondary programs in which they do not have the resources to succeed.

In the meantime, the most urgent challenge is to help the students who canceled their postsecondary plans during the pandemic get back on track. Early signs for this Fall semester are not promising, despite improvements in public health and the economy. In July, completions of the FAFSA—the US federal financial aid form—were down nearly 5 percent from last year, signaling that the enrollment decline may persist this academic year. It is unclear whether continued financial challenges, health concerns, or even incentives to return to work are leaving potential students reluctant to start or resume their education.

The unfortunate reality is that employers' preferences for workers with postsecondary education are not going to change. The students who left community colleges amid the COVID-19 pandemic may get a short-term boost in pay amid the current worker shortages, but they risk being left behind in the long term in an increasingly competitive labor force. ◢

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28

If Not Now, When? Short-Cycle Programs in Latin America

Maria Marta Ferreyra

Upskilling and reskilling the population for the new world of work was already an essential task before March 2020, but the COVID-19 pandemic has made it urgent. Indeed, around the world the pandemic has accentuated preexisting trends such as automation, the use of electronic platforms, and the dominance of technical and analytical skills—all of which have destroyed many jobs, yet also created others. For higher-income and lower-income countries alike, the skills agenda is crucial to bringing people back to work, while equipping them for this new environment. This agenda is even more pressing for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), as the region most economically battered by the pandemic.

Short and practical, short-cycle programs (SCPs) are uniquely suited to the challenge. They are attractive to students with little interest, time, resources, or preparation for a bachelor program, as well as for other individuals who might just be seeking additional skills. They are also attractive to employers who struggle to find staff equipped with the desired skills. However, SCPs are viewed in LAC as the lesser higher education choice—a stigma that is perhaps unfair, as discussed below.

The SCP Landscape in LAC

Higher education in LAC has expanded dramatically in recent years, with gross enrollment rates rising from 23 to 52 percent in the new millennium. SCPs, however, capture only 9 percent of all LAC higher education students, substantially below the global rate of 24 percent. SCPs are a relatively late addition to LAC's higher education landscape, and the types of institutions authorized to provide SCPs (universities, nonuniversities, or both) vary according to country. SCP programs last two or three years and while many claim to provide pathways toward more advanced degrees, in practice this is often not the case.

Students in SCPs are more disadvantaged and less traditional than those in bachelor programs. Nonetheless, they obtain favorable academic and labor market outcomes. They graduate at higher rates than bachelor students (57 versus 46 percent). Although they earn lower wages than bachelor program graduates—as expected—they obtain better outcomes than bachelor program dropouts: Their unemployment rate is lower (3.8 vs. 6.1 percent), their formal employment rate is higher (82 versus 67 percent), and their wages are higher (by 13 percent). Even accounting for student characteristics, on average SCP graduates earn 60 percent more than high school graduates and 25 percent more than bachelor dropouts. Moreover, SCP graduates are in high demand relative to bachelor program graduates, as evidenced by vacancies posted on online portals.

Not all SCPs are equally good, however. Programs' labor market outcomes, net-of-costs returns, and value-added-to-student outcomes vary dramatically across fields, institutions, students, and geographic areas. Since the same is true for bachelor programs, it turns out that many SCPs provide better outcomes and returns than many bachelor programs. Yet, for an uninformed student, this high variation poses considerable risk.

The SCP supply in LAC is highly dynamic, as SCPs enter and exit the market ("churn") more frequently than bachelor programs. Institutions open new SCPs in response to local labor market needs, with private, nonuniversity institutions being the most responsive. In contrast, bachelor programs are less responsive than SCPs. Nimble and quick, SCPs are therefore able to adjust their offerings to the current context.

Abstract

Higher education in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has expanded dramatically in the new millennium, yet enrollment in short-cycle programs (SCPs) is still relatively low. Recent evidence indicates that while SCPs generate, on average, good labor market outcomes, they vary greatly in quality. Further, SCP providers respond rapidly and flexibly to local economy needs. Specific practices related to faculty, job search assistance, and interaction with prospective employers are distinctive of the best programs.

Short and practical, short-cycle programs (SCPs) are uniquely suited to the challenge.

What Makes a Program "Good"?

Consider a "good" program—one that generates good student outcomes after accounting for student characteristics. What makes it good? Entering the "black box" of program quality is fundamental to designing good programs, but is not possible with the limited information coming from standard datasets. To overcome this obstacle, at the World Bank we designed and implemented the World Bank Short-Cycle Program Survey (WB-SCPS) in Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru. We interviewed approximately 2,100 program directors between November 2019 and July 2020, by phone and online. Program directors answered many questions regarding program practices, characteristics, and inputs; student body; and student outcomes.

This rich data identifies the distinctive practices applied by the programs with the best outcomes. In terms of academic outcomes, students' dropout rate and time-to-degree are lower in programs that teach a fixed, structured curriculum; evaluate their faculty using peer evaluation; and hire faculty with industry experience. Regarding labor market outcomes, formal employment and wages are higher in programs that have adequate infrastructure for practical training, teach numerical competencies, offer remediation during the program, and hire faculty with industry experience. Further, those programs also interact frequently with the private sector and assist students in their job search. Although not causal, this evidence indicates that adopting such practices might allow programs to improve student outcomes, thereby reducing the wide, worrisome outcome variation that may partly explain the SCP stigma.

At this Critical Juncture

Is this stigma fair? Yes, and no. No, because of SCPs' successes and promise (which may be largely unknown); yes, because of their shortcomings. Rather than dismissing or relegating SCPs to the background of higher education—as may have been the tendency in the past—policy makers can address shortcomings through several, complementary policies. The first is collecting and disseminating program-level information about SCPs and bachelor programs, including average graduates' salaries and formal employment rates. This information is necessary for policy makers—who must regulate the sector—and for students—who should make informed choices. The second is providing financial assistance to SCP students. LAC countries provide a higher per-student subsidy to students on bachelor programs than those on SCPs—even though the latter are more disadvantaged—and rarely assist students in private institutions, who comprise half of the SCP enrollment. The third policy concerns oversight and regulation. Policy makers should evaluate programs using outcome-based accountability standards, screen them carefully at entry, and monitor them periodically. Crucially, they should close poorly performing programs. The fourth policy is creating flexible pathways to facilitate skill acquisition in "stackable" blocks as part of lifelong learning. Most importantly, policy makers have a responsibility to create an environment in which only good SCPs are offered and in which well-informed, interested students have the means to attend them.

SCPs might prove extremely helpful to bring people back to work and to prepare them for today's world of work. To the extent that they succeed, they might no longer be viewed as the lesser choice, but as the right choice for many at a time of great need. Time, therefore, is ripe for SCPs in LAC.

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Policy Rifts in UK Further and Higher Education

Michael Shattock

Abstract

The future of further education is under challenge in the United Kingdom. The government appears to see further education solely in terms of supporting the economy through the provision of an improved skills base. An alternative approach would be to bring coherence into the governance and management of further and higher education to create a tertiary education system. Implicit in adopting such an approach would be some decentralization of policy to regions, away from central government.

30

There have been two markets in operation, one in further education and the other in higher education

Further education colleges (FECs) grew up under local education authorities (LEAs), and were the seedbed for the establishment of polytechnics in 1967, but in 1993 they were incorporated, removed from LEA control, and given independent status. Further education (FE) is now funded in England through a Further Education and Skills Agency located under the Department for Education (DfE). Universities have been historically autonomous, but are now controlled by the Office for Students, also answerable to the DfE. In 1992, the governance and management of higher education (HE) was decentralized and later devolved to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and, residually, to England; FE followed HE.

Since 1993, FECs' progress has substantially depended on their recruitment market: They offer courses for 16 year olds for GCSE A-Level, for technological and professional courses, and for a range of bachelor of technology (BTec) intermediate courses; increasingly, they have become involved in access programs to HE and teaching for two-year foundation degrees in collaboration with universities. In effect, therefore, there have been two markets in operation, one in further education and the other in higher education, the latter formidably sharpened by the introduction, in 2012, of full cost tuition fees in place of direct government funding.

In 1993, when the sector was in effect created, there were around 450 FECs in the United Kingdom, but this figure has been greatly reduced through mergers in the intervening years to 294 in 2019, distributed as follows: England 248, Scotland 26, Wales 14, and Northern Ireland six. Meantime, the number of universities, mostly through the upgrading of former colleges of higher education, has grown so that the number of public universities now stands at 163. Over this period, FE in all four nations has been seen as the poor relation of postsecondary education, underfunded and attracting little political interest. Universities, on the other hand, sustained by increases in funding for research and the introduction of high levels of tuition fees (except in Scotland), have been comparatively well funded and have enjoyed (though that might not be the best description) maximum political attention. In 2020, Wales declared its intention to move to a tertiary education system, merging FE and HE policy considerations, as being more suited to its economic and geophysical circumstances. In 2021, Scotland, where 20 percent of HE has traditionally been carried out in FE, embarked on a consultation exercise with a view to following a similar path.

Current Developments in England

In 2019, the government published *The Post–18 Education Review* (the Augar Review), which in addition to recommending reductions in HE tuition fees, thus potentially destabilizing universities' finances, also recommended a much more positive role for FE, together with a much needed injection of capital funding for infrastructure. The government has yet to respond to the HE parts of the *Review* but has published two documents, a White Paper *Skills for jobs: Lifelong learning for opportunity and growth* (DfE, 2021) and a Policy Paper *Build back better: Our plan for growth* (H M Treasury, 2021), which aim to define its industrial strategy; both bear heavily on its view of the future of FE. The former states that the core mission of further education is to "increase productivity, support growth industries and give individuals opportunities to progress their careers" and that it aims to provide "a seamless and strong relationship between further education and industry"—not, it may be noted, with universities. Employers are "to have a central role in designing qualifications and training." The second document identifies the skills base as one of "the three pillars" of the investment required to realize the

plan, in which cities "will be the engines of growth" and innovation. The second pillar will "support and incentivise the development of creative ideas and technologies that will shape the United Kingdom's future high growth, sustainable and secure economy," thus reinforcing the gap between FE, responsible for the skills base, and HE, responsible for innovation and, presumably, creative ideas.

Subsequently, the DfE has revealed its wishes to introduce a new FE qualification, the T-level (T stands for Technical Qualifications-Level), to parallel GCSE A-level, and to streamline vocational courses, with the aim of eliminating "second rate qualifications." This is being strongly opposed by college heads and has been described as "vandalism" by a former secretary of state. It is strongly implied that restraints will be imposed on HE numbers, probably in nonvocational disciplines, to enable financial support to be given to an expansion of FE.

Essentially, these reforms suggest first, that the future role of FE will simply be as a technological feeder for high tech industry and second, that as a sector it will continue to be operated separately from HE with only minimal policy coordination with HE. This implies a narrowing of FE functions, which, it has been estimated, would exclude up to 20 percent of students who would not be able to meet the T-level entry requirements in English and maths and would severely reduce the range of professional qualifications that colleges currently offer. It would also significantly deemphasize the important role that is undertaken by colleges in supporting widening participation in HE by reaching out into areas of social and economic decline.

An Alternative Policy—The Development of Tertiary Approaches

The most significant losses from these new policies are the lack of policy coherence between the two sides of postsecondary education and the failure to recognize the undoubted effectiveness with which colleges work closely with their communities. These point to the need to unify the governance and management of the two sectors and move toward a tertiary education system. Recent research by Shattock and Hunt estimates that on the basis of a 45 percent response rate from FECs, 89 percent had joint arrangements or direct partnerships with universities in the areas of student upward progression, franchising arrangements, validation agreements, and apprenticeship degree programs. Moreover, many universities like Lincoln or Plymouth have partnerships with networks of colleges located in areas of economic and social deprivation, which provide critical routes into further and higher education.

In a situation where it is claimed that the United Kingdom suffers from greater economic inequality between regions than anywhere else in Europe and while, according to government statistics, 260 of 317 local authority districts in England contain one of the 20 percent most deprived areas in the country, the role of FE in collaboration with HE makes an essential contribution to a national "levelling up" agenda. But to achieve this, it will not be enough to eliminate policy silos in central government. Moving decision-making much closer to the regions where local knowledge can play a larger part will be much more effective.

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Alternatives to University Education in Germany

Barbara M. Kehm

32

Abstract

The German higher education system is a binary system consisting predominantly of universities and universities of applied sciences (UASs), originally conceived as teaching-only institutions offering applied degrees. This article focuses on the UAS sector, but also provides information on vocational education and training (regarded as postsecondary, but nonacademic and not part of higher education). It shows why and how an increasing blurring of boundaries is taking place among the different sectors of postsecondary education.

The postsecondary nonuniversity sector in Germany is a rather complex landscape consisting of different types of higher education institutions and a large vocational education and training system. Furthermore, there is a distinction between public and private institutions. This article describes this arrangement and provides an account of some of its problems.

Universities of Applied Sciences

Despite their official English name, universities of applied sciences (UASs, *Fachhochschulen*) are considered to be nonuniversity institutions. They were introduced as a new type of higher education institution in 1972 to form an alternative to universities, with the intention of creating additional study places during a phase of higher education expansion. Originally, they were conceived as teaching-only institutions with no research and no right to award doctoral degrees. Students wanting to enroll at UASs were able to do so after 12 years of schooling instead of the usual 13 years required for entering a university. Professors at UASs were not required to have a *habilitation* (a form of second doctorate), but instead had to have at least five years of professional experience outside the higher education sector. After German unification in 1990, UASs were also introduced in the new East German states where they did not previously exist. Currently, about 40 percent of all students in Germany study at a UAS.

The German public higher education system consists of 121 universities, 218 UASs, and 57 higher education institutions for art and music. Among the 218 UASs, there are 30 "UASs for public administration," specializing in training for the various professions in the public sector. Compared to universities, UASs offer mostly applied or practice-oriented degree programs, have a smaller spectrum of subjects, and mostly offer bachelor degrees. The main subject groups that can be found at UASs are engineering, business administration, and healthcare/social work. Over time, a large variety of subjects (e.g., tourism, real estate, hotel management, and others) have been added as a result of academization. It is also typical for degree programs at UASs to include at least one obligatory internship.

The originally clear differences between universities and UASs have blurred to some extent. A good number of UASs have become involved in research and development, often applied and often in cooperation with private sector institutions or companies. They also offer master level degrees in at least some subjects. In a couple of German states, UASs have even been given the right to award doctoral degrees in those subjects in which they have a strong research portfolio. In the other states, UAS graduates who want to start a doctoral program can do so provided that their institution has a cooperation agreement with a university, which then awards the degree. In such cases, supervision is shared between a university professor and a UAS professor. Universities have tried to protect and defend their monopolized authority to award doctoral degrees and were not happy at all about this blurring of differences between the two sectors.

Dual Higher Education Institutions

Germany has two other types of nonuniversity higher education institutions: UASs for public administration (mentioned above) and, in some states, so-called "dual higher education institutions." There are 30 UASs for public administration in the German higher education system, with somewhat more than 57,000 students. They constitute a special type, or subtype of the UAS sector. Students at these institutions are employees in public administration, often civil servants, delegated to study by their employers in

order to upgrade their professional qualifications and become eligible for promotion in the public service. After graduation, they return to their previous workplace or another workplace within public service.

There are altogether 41 dual higher education institutions in Germany, most of them in the states of Baden–Wuerttemberg and Thuringia. While these institutions fall within the higher education sector in the former state, they are part of the postsecondary vocational education and training sector in the latter. Students with a secondary school leaving certificate and a vocational education and training contract with a company can study at these institutions for three years and graduate with an applied bachelor degree, while at the same time undergoing their practical training. Dual degree programs are by now also offered at universities and UASs, resulting in yet another form of blurring of differences between sectors.

Postsecondary Vocational Education and Training

Germany is well-known for having a large and very successful sector of (postsecondary) vocational education and training, which is not regarded as part of the higher education sector. Access to each profession in this sector requires about three to three-and-a-half years of education and training. Altogether, there are 325 different trades, crafts, and professions for which this sector is responsible. The vocational education aspect is carried out by professional schools and provides the more theoretical framework of the body of knowledge of a given profession, trade, or craft. The training aspect is offered in companies, firms, the public sector, and by craftsmen. The vocational training aspect requires the presence of a master craftsman or -woman.

Vocational education and training is divided into six large professional fields: industry and trade (including banking, insurance, catering, and transport and traffic); craftsmanship; agriculture; public service; independent professions; and home economics. Degrees awarded include categories such as skilled worker or technician, craftsman or -woman, and master craftsman or -woman. In 2019, there were almost 1.33 million trainees (with a 35 percent proportion of women) enrolled in the vocational education and training sector, which is more than the number of students at UASs. Because trainees are participating in productive work carried out by their respective employers, they receive a modest salary from their first day onward, which increases every year.

However, this sector is confronted with another type of boundary blurring, in that an increasing number of crafts, trades, and professions are moving their education and training into the higher education sector (UASs or dual higher education institutions). But it is not at all the case that the various institutions and sectors are happy with such blurring of differences and academization processes. Education experts have anticipated these developments for quite some time. These developments are considered to be mainly due to the introduction of the two-tiered system of bachelor and master degrees through the implementation of the Bologna Process and global developments due to the rise of knowledge societies and economies. ◢

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Ireland: A Cautionary Tale about Free Tuition

Arthur M. Hauptman

Abstract
Irish higher education has had a mixed experience since 1995, when tuition was eliminated for full-time undergraduates. Enrollments have doubled, the completion rate has remained high, and the attainment rate has tripled (although mostly a function of well-educated foreign workers settling in Ireland). But equity remains a problem and boom-and-bust funding tied to the economy has contributed to quality concerns. Lessons for countries considering free tuition regimens include that sustained funding is critical to success.

34

Beginning in 1995, Ireland eliminated tuition fees for full-time university undergraduates, which, at the time, were 20 percent higher than what was being charged at public US flagships. But, at the same time, tuition was replaced with a system of registration fees for all students, which then was USD 200 in today's dollars, but now is about USD 3,600, a ten-fold increase in real terms. This is less than average tuition in the United States, but more than what many European countries now charge for tuition. Simultaneously, the Irish government also instituted payments-in-lieu-of-fees to institutions, to offset some of the lost tuition.

The hope in Ireland then was pretty much what free-tuition advocates now hope in other countries: more students enrolling in college, better access for the disadvantaged, and more degrees leading to more graduates in the workforce—all while maintaining or improving the quality of higher education.

What Did the Irish Get from Their Free-Tuition Regimen?

- Funding and resources: Since tuition fees were eliminated in the mid-1990s, higher education funding in Ireland has experienced a pattern of boom and bust. Government resources have tended to grow when the economy was booming, but declined during economic downturns. Revenues from tuition charged to some students, and registration fees from all students often could not keep up with cuts in government funding. Over the full 25-year period, spending per student increased modestly when adjusted for inflation. But the growth in all resources devoted to Irish higher education has lagged behind economic growth. As a result, higher education spending as a share of GDP, traditionally low by international standards, declined further still between 1995 to 2015, while higher education's spending as a share of GDP was increasing in many other industrialized countries.

- Participation: Enrollments in Irish higher education have doubled since free tuition was introduced, fueled both by one of the fastest growing populations in Europe and an increase in the college-going rate from one-third in the 1990s to more than one-half in recent years. With an expanding college-age population, demand for college would have grown anyway, but free tuition was likely an important contributor to the increase in the Irish college-going rate.

- Equity of access: Improving access for disadvantaged students was a principal motivation for free tuition in Ireland. Yet the data indicates that there has been limited progress on that front. To be sure, students from low-income families participate more in Irish higher education than they did two decades ago, but they remain much less likely to enroll than students from wealthier families, especially at the most selective universities.

- Degree completion: The number of undergraduate degrees conferred has grown by roughly two-thirds since free tuition came along—a result of the increase in the college-going rate and the maintenance of a degree-completion rate exceeding 80 percent. The ability of Ireland to maintain high completion rates while sharply increasing access is due at least in part to its centralized selective admissions process.

- Degree attainment: The most remarkable Irish achievement since tuition fees were eliminated was the tripling in the attainment rate—the share of workers who hold a college degree. As a result, Ireland now has one of the highest attainment rates in the world and, so, is viewed as one of the great success stories in international higher education over the past quarter century. But the Irish attainment rate explosion has been more a function of immigration

> *The number of undergraduate degrees conferred has grown by roughly two-thirds since free tuition came along.*

patterns than of any investment in higher education. Over time, Irish youth have tended to emigrate to other countries during economic hard times. But during the Celtic Tiger era, at the end of the twentieth century, and into the first part of the twenty-first century, knowledge-intensive and high-tech companies became key drivers of the Irish economy and attracted large numbers of well-educated workers from other countries. As a result, foreign-born workers in Ireland are now a larger share of the workforce and have a much higher attainment rate than native-born workers. This is in contrast to many other OECD countries, including the United States, where native-born workers are a larger share of the workforce and their attainment rate typically exceeds that of foreign-born workers.

► Education quality: The Irish record for providing a high-quality higher education system is mixed. An institution-based quality assurance program and qualifications framework get very good grades in international discussions. But the modest growth in resources combined with much more rapid growth in enrollments over time has strained the system, contributing to higher student/faculty ratios and deterioration of many facilities and equipment. While quality in higher education is hard to measure in any country, many observers believe that Irish higher education quality has suffered in some significant ways since free tuition was introduced.

Lessons for Countries Considering Free Tuition Plans
The Irish experience with free tuition has a number of lessons for the various countries that are actively exploring free college options. To be successful, tuition-free college demands sustained high levels of government investment to replace the tuition fees that students would have paid, and to increase resources beyond that. Without such a sustained financial commitment, quality will suffer, especially if enrollments grow rapidly.

It is also clear from the Irish experience that eliminating tuition fees does not guarantee greater equity of access to college. Without additional measures such as help with living expenses for impoverished students and more counseling services, stratification will continue, as students from wealthier families will enroll in larger proportions in the most selective institutions.

Not charging tuition fees does not mean that students will not have to pay anything to go to college. When tuition fees were eliminated in the 1990s, Ireland's modest registration fee seemed a reasonable way to ensure that some costs would still be paid by students. But the rapid growth in registration fees over time means that they have replaced a large chunk of what would have been tuition fees. So Irish higher education now is far from free. In this regard, Ireland is similar to some other countries and US states such as California, where tuition is not charged but fees can be quite steep.

The remarkable growth in the share of workers with a college degree in Ireland since free tuition policies were adopted has been much more a function of economic development policies and immigration trends than any investment—or lack thereof—in the higher education system.

Finally, the creation of a government-paid fee to institutions to replace some of the fees that students would have paid was a good idea. But the aggregate amount of funding for these fees has been capped since the program was created, meaning that as enrollments grew, the per-student payment declined, leaving growing institutions strapped for cash. A per-student fee that remained constant with the growth in enrollments would have been a much better approach.

But all in all, the Irish experience with free tuition over the past quarter century contains a number of important lessons as various countries consider free college proposals. ◄

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36

Many Arab Professors Lose Interest in Academia

Rasha Faek

Abstract

A recent study by *Al-Fanar Media* found that many professors in the Middle East are discouraged by work conditions at universities and the lack of independent bodies to defend their rights.

University professors in Arab countries have long complained about poor wages, but recent interviews and research also found widespread dissatisfaction with other work conditions, such as lack of basic benefits and short-term contracts that make their livelihoods precarious. Many are also discouraged by the absence of independent faculty unions to defend their rights.

Interviews with 75 professors at public and private universities in 11 countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates) reveal that because of these conditions—and the failure of governments and universities to address them—some regret having chosen an academic career. It is also a cause of exodus of academic talent from the region.

While professors at private universities often have good salaries compared to their counterparts in public universities, many still say they do not receive basic benefits such as social or health insurance, and work under contracts that specify their teaching tasks and their pay, but without any other allowances.

Many professors lack basic job security because they work under contracts that university administrations can terminate without prior notice and without paying compensation. Moreover, public universities, which usually pay lower wages, have recently started discontinuing temporary contracts with many professors, due to the urgency of calls to hire more faculty members and the lack of necessary funding. As a result, many professors work today with low salaries and without benefits.

Negative Effects on Teaching

"The lack of job benefits negatively affects our academic work, especially in light of our overcrowded classrooms," says Jemil El-Hadjarin, a professor at Manouba University in Tunisia. "We feel we are treated unjustly and try to compensate for that by overtime work in other professions most of the time. Some of us may give up teaching altogether or emigrate to work in another country."

A university professor in Jordan, who switched from working in a private university to business, agrees with El-Hadjarin. "My father and uncles are all university professors," he said, "yet today I regret choosing such a career, which no longer has the same social status or job benefits. University professors do not have any real job benefits, and they are vulnerable to violence by students amid the lack of an institution that protects and defends them," he says.

The situation is not that different in many other Arab countries, where, according to the interviewees, the majority of employment contracts at private universities adopt the "agreements must be kept" principle, whereby universities specify the tasks of professors in exchange for material remuneration, without any health and social insurance benefits, or allowances for travel or research.

In Kuwait, "a public university professor is ultimately protected by the same regulations protecting any public civil servant," said Ibrahim Al-Hmoud, president of the Kuwait University Faculty Association. "Those working in private universities have much less job guarantees than those working in a public university," a condition which the faculty association believes "requires expediting the development of legislation that provides greater protection for faculty members."

Lack of Job Protection

Copies of contracts obtained by *Al-Fanar Media* reveal that most private universities hire instructors on short-term work contracts that may include just one renewable semester, and administrators have absolute authority to terminate the contract at any time.

"I think that the lack of long-term contracts makes professors live in a state of psychological instability because they are likely to have to leave at any time," says Mazhar El-Shorbagy, an assistant professor of philosophy at Deraya University in Egypt's Minya Governorate.

Omar Draider, a professor in the Petroleum Engineering Department at Libya's Al-Rifaq University, in Tripoli, Libya, agrees with El-Shorbagy about the negative impact of the type of contracts common at private universities. "Despite our good wages, we are threatened with the prospect of being dismissed at any time, this threatens any professor or scholar's job stability."

In Sudan, universities come under "the same law applied to private companies, enabling them to dispense with any employee at any time," saiys Khaled Hassan, an assistant professor with the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Garden City, a public institution in Khartoum. He points out that he previously worked in a private university that expelled professors and did not allow them to reenter university buildings, even to collect their personal belongings from their offices.

Meanwhile, public university contracts seem more equitable, as professors are often hired under the general labor law applied to all public jobs, or the university employment law, under which professors receive social insurance and sometimes health insurance, if there is a health insurance system in the country. Contracts also sometimes include other compensations and a pension upon termination of service.

Weak Union Support

In many Arab countries, there are no unions or other advocacy entities that include university professors and defend their rights. None of the countries in the study have unions for professors at private universities. In Sudan, university professors are seeking to form a single general union of representatives of faculty unions at each university, with the aim of uniting their efforts to become a more influential entity. Nevertheless, efforts to form unions are not always successful. This is the case in Jordan. "Rights are usually protected by professional associations," says Suleiman Al-Olaimat, a faculty member at Jordan University of Science and Technology. "Several attempts have been made to establish a union of university professors including public and private university professors," he says, "but unfortunately, all attempts reached a dead end."

Poor Work Environment

The problems of university professors are not limited to work contracts or the lack of supportive bodies. They face other problems, such as lack of external and internal training opportunities, work compensation, and the provision of housing and transportation for employees from far away cities or areas. Universities do not provide professors with free computers or internet services on campus.

Some interviewees also point out an absence of incentives for scientific research and unjust procedures for promotion. "Academic work has become a burden on university professors," says an Algerian university professor. "There are no incentives to work. This leads to a lack of passion and has turned teaching into a difficult profession."

The negative consequences of the lack of job benefits do not only affect professors, but the entire educational process, as many professors stop working and seek opportunities abroad, which causes a great loss of human resources. Mamdouh Taj, an assistant professor at the library department at Omdurman Islamic University in Sudan, says: "The results are catastrophic for Sudanese universities, with an estimation of about 13,000 qualified professors who emigrated in recent years to the Arab Gulf states and Europe. [...] The lack of interest in improving the status of professors [is] reflected in a lower quality of university education and the levels of graduates alike."

37

In many Arab countries, there are no unions or other advocacy entities that include university professors and defend their rights.

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CIHE Publications

The Center for International Higher Education (CIHE), in partnership with the American Council on Education, recently published the ninth in its open access series, International Briefs for Higher Education Leaders. The ninth issue focuses on Women's Representation in Higher Education Leadership around the World and features contributions from a number of countries, including Australia, Finland, Ghana, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa.

A full list of CIHE-affiliated publications is available on the CIHE website.

CIHE Updates

Personnel Updates
We are delighted to announce that Chris R. Glass has joined CIHE as our newest affiliate faculty member. Chris' primary responsibility at Boston College will be to direct the new Executive Doctorate in Higher Education, but he will also be affiliated to both the Center and our MA program in International Higher Education.

Monthly Webinars
Please join us for our monthly international higher education webinar series! The full calendar of events is available on our website. Individuals may also request the join the CIHE mailing list by emailing us at internationalhighered@bc.edu.

CIHE Conference

Due to ongoing challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic, we have made the difficult decision to postpone the launch of our new biennial Conference on International Higher Education until June 2023. Further information about the conference, including information about how to submit a proposal, will be available by summer 2022.

www.internationalhighereducation.net